Personal Identity, Divine Love, and Extrinsic Individuation

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I

EARLY *STAR TREK* EPISODES FEATURED Scotty beaming Kirk up and down from the surface of the planets around which the Enterprise was orbiting. As a child, I remember thinking Kirk was on the ship, then on the planet, and later back on the ship. Clearly, the transporter was a much better way of getting around than other options!

But one evening, my 14-year-old self experienced disquieting thoughts after watching Kirk dissolve in the transporter room. I had surmised by now that the transporter works by somehow taking an informational picture of Kirk's body, erasing that body in the transporter room, sending the information to the planet's surface, and then reconstituting another body down below according to the informational picture. I vividly remember thinking, "What would happen if the transporter were to *break down*?" What if the machine, after taking the informational picture of Kirk, failed to reconstitute him on the planet's surface? Would Kirk then be *dead*?

But it did not seem quite right to think Kirk dead because, presumably, the machine had stored Kirk's information so he could be reconstituted after the transporter was fixed.[1] How could Kirk be dead now if he could be reconstituted later? Was Kirk somehow still alive because of his information? Moreover, if he were dead now because he was not yet reconstituted, would he not be dead every time he took the transporter, for does it not take *a little* time after dissolution to be reconstituted? What is it to *be dead* in this scenario, a scenario where *some time always elapses* between Kirk's "erasure" on the Enterprise and his reconstitution down below? Does the continuity of Kirk's information mean that, in some sense, Kirk is never really dead?[2]

As I grew older, other thoughts arose when considering Kirk and his transporter. What if another type of malfunction occurred, and Kirk was transported to three places at the same time? Would there now be three Kirks, or would one be more legitimately Kirk than the rest? If so, which one would this be? Would the reconstituted Kirk closest in time to the dissolved Kirk be *more Kirk* than the rest? Or

what if there were one hundred different Kirk bodies reconstituted on one hundred different planets exactly at the same time? Would the Kirk reconstituted closest in space to the original Kirk be more Kirk than the rest? Does it even make sense to talk about *degrees of* Kirk?

Although I did not realize it then, I had stumbled onto the philosophical problem of personal identity. In considering all these Kirks and trying to discern which was *truly* Kirk, I confronted the issue of what makes a person a person, that is, what are the necessary and sufficient conditions for a person to be the person that the person is? The question of personhood is a question of *particularity*, for it makes no sense to speak of *general* persons.

Long before *Star Trek* episodes, there were *Bugs Bunny* cartoons. While I don't remember most episodes with clarity, I do remember one where Bugs Bunny and Yosemite Sam changed bodies. Somehow, the cartoon made it clear that Yosemite Sam's body was inhabited by Bugs Bunny, and Bugs Bunny's body was where Yosemite Sam was now. Of course, it never occurred to me then to ask explicitly whether what made Bugs Bunny "Bugs Bunny" was Bug's Bunny's *body*. Yet I knew how Bugs *behaved*, and some of those behaviors were now exhibited by Yosemite Sam's body, thus displaying lucidly (to me then) that Bugs was now present in Sam. Bug's voice and mannerisms told me that Bugs Bunny could occupy the body of Yosemite Sam and remain Bugs Bunny.[3]

I don't remember if Bugs ever *forgot* he was Bugs Bunny when inhabiting Yosemite Sam, but I do remember thinking what it would have been like to be Bugs when he was inhabiting Sam and thinking that it was surely possible that Bugs *could forget* who he was. Being Bugs without Bugs' body was easily conceivable because I could clearly see Bugs in Yosemite Sam's body, but now a new question had emerged: Could Bugs simply forget he was Bugs and start to act like Yosemite Sam? Moreover, could Bugs forget altogether about his experience of being in Sam's body? It would be one thing for Bugs to lose his body and another thing to lose his *mind*. For my eight-year-old self, such things were clearly *conceivable*.

II

I DID NOT KNOW THEN THAT the *Star Trek* and *Bugs Bunny* shows were teaching me the philosophical problem of *personal identity*: What is it that makes a single person the selfsame person he or she is? How is it that a person at one time is the same individual as that person at another time? This question connects to the ancient problem of change: What is it that is constant during the process of change? How can we say that something changes? After all, if it changes, it is not the same thing; if it is the same thing, it does not really change. If there is change, how does not everything

change? Moreover, if not everything changes, how does some *this* remain that does not change when there is nonetheless a change in everything with respect to the *this*?

The grammar of our language clearly suggests that not everything can change. In fact, if everything were to change, as the pre-Socratic philosopher Heraclitus suggested, then there would not be anything at all constant with respect to which one could say "that has changed."[4]

Aristotle famously claimed that primary substances remain even though there are changes to these substances. He theorized that primary substances change with respect to the accidents they can assume. Accidents were *present in* or *inhered in* a particular thing. For Aristotle, the very same particular thing can change with respect to its quantity, quality, relative (relation), *habitus* (state), time, location, situation (position), action, and affection (passion). It's the *very same* auto whether it was *here* or *there*, whether it was owned by *Bob* or *Frank*, or whether it hit *this* car or *that* one.[5]

But now the question: what is it about a primary substance that makes it *this* primary substance and not *another*? What are the features of a thing by virtue of which that thing is the thing it is and are accordingly *constant* no matter what accidents it might have? Aristotle claimed that what can be *said of* the substance pertains to those features, while what is *present in* the substance concerns the accidents. The later philosophical tradition regularly used the term *essence* to refer to those features of a thing that re-identify it across different occasions or situations wherein different accidents are present.[6]

Now, the problem of personal identity is the problem of change as it relates to the person. What are those features that make a person a particular person in distinction from those properties that the person might (or might not) exhibit? We call those features that must be present for the person to be the person the *necessary* features or properties of the person, and those properties that the person can either exhibit or not exhibit the *contingent* features or properties of the person. Now the question arises fully: What properties are *constitutive* of personal identity, i.e., what are the *necessary* and *sufficient* features of Bob by virtue of which Bob is Bob? Or one might even say, what is Bob's *essence* on the basis of which he is identical to himself?[7]

The problem of personal identity is a species of the problem of change, and the problem of change is related to the use of *subjunctive* or *counterfactual* conditionals. Let us examine the logic of these interrogatives:

(1) What if Russia were to win the war with Ukraine?
(2) What if Germany were to have won World War II?

Although Russia has not yet won nor lost the war with Ukraine, we regularly think about what *might* happen if it did or did not. After all, Russia c*ould win* this war. Accordingly, (1) with its "were to win the war," expresses a subjunctive situation

that has not yet happened. (2) expresses, however, a counterfactual situation, for although Germany lost the war, we can ask what would happen "were Germany to have won" it. Consider the following:

(3) If Russia were to win the war, Ukrainian industry would be devastated.

(4) If Germany were to have won World War II, German would now be the official language of commerce.

Both express hypotheticals. In (3), the future has not happened, but in a future where Russia wins the war, then Ukraine's industry would be devastated. We might, for starters, symbolize this as "R → U," with R meaning "Russia wins" and U signifying "Ukraine's industry is devastated." Notice that (2) is symbolized the same way, with W meaning "Germany wins World War II" and S signifying "German is the official language of commerce." The counterfactual conditional "W → S" has the same logical form as the subjunctive conditional "R → U." Both are if-then statements, where the antecedent (the "if part" of the statement) is assumed to obtain for the sake of the conditional, though it in fact does not. (In the subjunctive, the antecedent has not happened but still could, and in the counterfactual, the antecedent states what did not happen but could have). The "then part" of the statement is the conditional's consequent that declares what is the case were the antecedent to have occurred.[8] So far, so good. Now consider the following:

(5) If Frank wins the lottery, Frank will buy Mary a ring.

(6) If Bob were older, he would not have hit Fred.

(5) expresses a subjunctive conditional, but we can now be more granular in our symbolization than merely "F → M." The antecedent asserts "Frank wins the lottery," while the consequent declares "Frank buys Mary a ring." Now allow "f" to refer to Frank, "m" to Mary, "Lx" to "x wins the lottery," and "Bxy" to "x buys y a ring." Symbolizing we have "Wf → Bfm." The subjunctive conditional states that if Frank wins, then Frank buys Mary a ring. What is constant across the conditional is Frank. The "f" in the antecedent must refer to the same individual as the "f" in the consequent. Frank must be the *same* guy whether he wins the lottery or whether he buys a ring for Mary or not. The personal identity of Frank does not change across the antecedent and consequent of a subjunctive conditional.

The same is obviously the case in (6). If Bob had been older (which he is not), he would not have hit Fred (which, apparently, he did). Symbolizing, we have "Ob → ~Hbf" where "O" to "is older," and "Hxy" to "x hits y." Again, the personal identity of Bob must be constant across the antecedent and consequent of the conditional.[9]

But what is it that makes Frank, Frank, and Bob, Bob? Why can we use the same constant "f" in (5) to refer to Frank in the antecedent and consequent and 'b' in (6) to refer both in the antecedent and consequent to Bob?

This question really seems to matter to us. Why is this? Sydney Shoemaker writes:

Central to virtually every person's concerns is the desire to continue in existence with a life worth living. In some important sense, survival of persons "matters," especially to the persons themselves. And survival seems to involve identity. Locke remarked that "person" is a "forensic" term, because of the tie between personal identity and such matters as responsibility and compensation; and clearly the fact that the person held responsible for an action should be the person who did the action, and the person compensated for a wrong should be the person who suffered from it, is intimately related to the fact that people care about their own futures in the way they do.[10]

If Bob hits Fred, and Fred seeks revenge, he wants his revenge to apply to the one who hit him, i.e., to Bob. He is likely not going to be satisfied if he hits a likeness of Bob or somebody similar to Bob. In fact, if Fred were to hit *that* person, he will have committed an unprovoked attack on *somebody else.* Not only will Fred have failed to "right his wrong" with Bob, but he now has also established a new situation where another has a ground to right his wrong against him.

Establishing personal identity is important in any kind of moral or legal judgment. When assigning punishments for deeds done, it is necessary to show that the guy really did it. Juries are often told that the person on the video doing the crime is the selfsame defendant they see before them. Moreover, the defendant is *sane*; the body they see before them, which is the body on the tape committing the crime, has the *same mind* now as he did when committing the crime. Consequently, two criteria for personal identity have been commonly used throughout the philosophical tradition: those of *bodily* and *psychological* continuity. The *body* view claims that an individual is identified by his or her physical body; the *psychological* or *personality* view argues that an individual is identified by his or her beliefs, desires, memories, dispositions, aims, etc.

The physical or body view has been ascribed to Aristotle but has many contemporary defenders.[11] Sometimes, a distinction is made between identifying the person with the whole body or simply with the brain.[12]

Both are *prima facie* plausible, but they both deny the intuitions that I (and many others) surely have had, for it seems to make sense that "I could have had a different body than the one I have, or I could have had a different brain." After all, I can imagine having a body that runs faster or jumps higher or a different brain with different synapses and neural flow.[13]

III

IMAGINE THAT YOUR FRIEND LEWIS told you on Thursday that he was going on a business trip for two weeks beginning the next day. Imagine your surprise on Saturday night

when you see Lewis eating with his wife Monica at Ted's Steakhouse! You go to the table, and Lewis stands up. Monica looks adoringly at her husband as he speaks clearly to you in the deep, resonant voice you always associate with Lewis. You, however, know that this can't be Lewis because Lewis said he was out of town for the next two weeks. Thus, you chide Monica for being out with another man while her husband is away. "How could you do this, Monica? Not only are you apparently cheating on Lewis, but the guy you are cheating with is indistinguishable from your husband. I am going to call Lewis and tell him what his wife has been up to!"

Monica looks at you with astonishment, "This *is* Lewis." But you say, "No, I talked to Lewis, and he assured me he would be out of town." Monica persists, "This is Lewis, the same guy you talked to yesterday." You ask, "Why should I believe that, Monica? How convenient to cheat with somebody indistinguishable from your husband. You think that nobody will know." Monica retorts, "I can prove this is Lewis! I was with him since he left you, and there is no way a look-alike has shown up to take his place." Momentarily disarmed by this, you ask Monica for more explanation.

"OK," she says, "You agree that this body looks like that of Lewis's, right?"

"Exactly the same," you reply, "but I trust Lewis and thus know that this is not Lewis, though his body looks like Lewis' body."

"It is the same body," Monica retorts, "because this body is *continuous* with Lewis'."

"How do you know that?" you counter.

Monica says, "I was with Lewis yesterday, though you did not see me. I watched Lewis talk to you and then walk towards me after talking with you. I then was with him continuously through the night and until this very time. Imagine t_1 is the time yesterday you and Lewis spoke, and the time today is t_n. I can verify that for all times t_i where i varies from 1 to n that I was in some causal contact with Lewis. I either saw him, touched him, smelled him, heard him, etc. There simply was no time for some other body that looks like Lewis to have been substituted for Lewis."

You are still not very impressed by the argument because you are certain that Lewis is out of town. "Well, I don't know about that, Monica; it seems to me perfectly conceivable that this Lewis look-alike showed up when you weren't looking closely enough or maybe even became an instant Lewis *Ersatz* when you were looking. I don't know the exact mechanism by which this happened, but I trust Lewis and know that this must have occurred." You remain convinced that Lewis is out of town, even if this seems to be Lewis's particular body, the very same body that talked with you yesterday was with Monica overnight and stands before you now.

In this argument, it appears that Monica's position is quite plausible. Lewis is identified by his *body*. It is very odd to claim that somebody else has a qualitatively

indiscernible body to Lewis, has the same causal relations with its environment, but is somehow *not* Lewis. Yet, Monica has not dispelled your doubt because it is *conceivable* that this body before you is not the body of Lewis.

Perhaps your perplexity is due to early imprinting from philosophically suspect Bugs Bunny cartoons. Just as it was conceivable to you that Bugs Bunny really existed in the body of Yosemite Sam, so it is conceivable that Lewis really is not in this Lewis-looking body. Scurrying away from Monica and her putative Lewis, you reach your study and pull down the old modal logic book that Willard Van Orman Quine taught you to distrust. Letting "Lx" be "x has a Lewis body," "l" be Lewis, and remembering that $\diamond$ means possibility and $\square$ necessity, you write:

(7) Ll & $\diamond$~Ll.

This says that it is the case that Lewis has a Lewis body, and it is possible that it is not the case that Lewis has a Lewis body. But that does not seem to express it clearly enough, for you want to affirm that there is an existing entity that is Lewis and he possibly does not have a Lewis body. So, employing an existential quantifier and equality sign, you write:

(8) $\exists$x[(x = l) & (Lx & $\diamond$~Lx)]

Now you are declaring that there is something that is Lewis, and while it is the case that this Lewis has a Lewis body, it is possible that this Lewis might not have had that body. It is, thus, a contingent matter whether Lewis has a Lewis body or not. Just like Bugs, Lewis can be Lewis without his body. Having been convinced of Kripke's possible world semantics over Hintikka's talk of models, you say, *while it is the case that Lewis has a Lewis body in this world, there is at least one possible world in which Lewis does not have a Lewis body.*[14] Since you can conceive Lewis not having a Lewis body in a possible world, *having a Lewis body* is not a Lewis-making characteristic of Lewis. I can project Lewis into subjunctive and counterfactual situations where Lewis is Lewis but does not have a Lewis body. Because this is conceivable – or *seems* conceivable – Lewis is not his body as (8) clearly states.[15]

Thinking about the logical form of the contingency of the body to Lewis, one naturally begins reflecting on the analogous issue of Bugs forgetting that he is Bugs. You ask yourself, "If Lewis is not re-identified across possible worlds based on his body, maybe he is so identified because of his mind. If physical continuity fails to keep Lewis *Lewis* in every possible world, perhaps psychological continuity cannot accomplish it either. After all, is it not conceivable that I might lose my memory and really act wholly differently than I have previously thought and acted?"

Think of the harrowing effects of dementia or other brain diseases. Alzheimer's patients forget their own children or even their own spouses, and people with brain

tumors often act and think quite differently than they once did. So, we ask ourselves: Is it conceivable that you can be you without having the thoughts you once had? Could you not forget everything that you once knew, act quite differently than before, and still be you? Simply put, is it not possible for you to be you without psychological continuity?

The situation seems analogous to that of the body. Clearly, I can conceive of myself – or seem to be able to conceive myself – not having the psychological states and dispositions that I have had. In other words, it seems I can project myself into the counterfactual situation of not having my own mental states. Thinking about Lewis, one might write as follows: "Mx means x has the mind of Lewis."

(9) ∃x [(X = l) & (Mx & ◇~Mx)]

(9) claims that having the mind of Lewis is not a Lewis-making property and, accordingly, that *something else* identifies Lewis across possible worlds other than psychological continuity. Maybe, just as Lewis could have a different body and still be Lewis, he could have a different mental history and still be Lewis. Accordingly, neither our bodies nor our minds are sufficient to identify us across possible worlds. Maybe, in fact, having this body and this mental history is a *contingent* matter, and *something deeper than my body or my mental states constitutes my person.*

IV

So, what remains? What about souls? Are we not ultimately souls that *have* bodies and minds? After all, reincarnation teaches that something exists that has this body and thoughts in this life and another body and different thoughts in another life. Unfortunately, this traditional answer to the problem of identity brings with it some very deep problems.

Imagine Bill and John at a cocktail party discussing the criterion of personal identity. Bill knows that persons can't be re-identified by their bodies because it is logically possible to have a different body, or perhaps no body at all. Bill is a Christian who learned that upon death, one either exists felicitously in heaven or perhaps horribly in hell, and thus, he has never thought that his body determines his identity.

Bill believes that disembodied existence is possible and realizes that making one's body the criterion of one's personal identity makes the following subjunctive conditional unsatisfiable, "If I were to die, I would enjoy the beatific vision with God." Since bodily criteria must re-identify persons across possible worlds, one cannot connect the "I" of the antecedent to the "I" of the consequent. Bill knows that identifying personhood with the body means that there is no reason to think that the one surviving death is the same person as the one living. Consequently, Bill

claims that the criterion of identity must be the *soul*, and it is logically possible for souls to have different bodies and mental histories than they have.

John points out to Bill that religious teachings are quite uneven in their views of what people in this life take to the next life. Reincarnation teaches, in general, that either there is no bodily or psychological continuity between what persons take in this life to the next, or if there is some mental continuity, it is deeply occluded. Documented cases of people remembering past lives are available, but it is notable that most of those accounts do not support direct psychological continuity. John is convinced that there is not much evidence that the person remembering has *psychological continuity* with a person who once lived.

Moreover, trying to make psychological continuity connect pre-mortem and post-mortem life seems a misguided effort when psychological continuity clearly fails to re-identify individuals in this life. Lisa was in a car accident and has amnesia, and recognizes nobody she knew before. She has no memories of pre-amnesia existence. However, her husband, James, has no trouble recognizing that it is Lisa because the person who does not know him looks exactly like Lisa, and he can, in principle, trace the physical continuity of Lisa's body over time.

Knowing that neither the physical qua physical nor the mental qua mental can work to individuate Lisa, Bill and John finally agree that only the ancient view of an immaterial soul can provide the continuity of personal identity. Lisa's soul could presumably have *both* a different body and a different psychology. Accordingly, the individuality of a person is best explained by pointing to individual souls, to which bodies and psychological characteristics are merely *accidental*.

Unfortunately, neither John nor Bill has thought deeply enough about what individuates souls. What is it about an immaterial Lisa soul that re-identifies her across possible worlds? What are the properties of Lisa's soul by virtue of which she is Lisa and not Molly, and what are the properties of Molly's soul by virtue of which she is Molly and not Lisa? If immaterial souls individuate persons, what are the essential features of Molly and Lisa's immaterial souls that differentiate the one from the other?

This is a very thorny question that relates to part of *Leibniz's Law*, e.g., the identity of indiscernibles. Try making a list of the properties of Lisa's soul, e.g., immateriality, simplicity, eternality, etc. Notice that these look like the very same set of properties that Mary's soul would have. Now consider the identity of indiscernibles expressed as follows, where x and y range over all individuals and P over all properties.

(10) $\forall x \forall y \forall P[(Px \leftrightarrow Py) \rightarrow (x = y)]$

For any individuals (like the souls of Molly and Lisa), if the individuals have the same set of properties (Lisa's soul has the same characteristics as Molly's soul), then

the individuals turn out to be the *same individual*. While this is the case for Lisa and Molly, *a fortiori* it applies to any putative individual soul whatsoever. Applying (10) to individual souls, we discover that all putative individual souls are the same soul! This is clearly not the result that Bill had hoped for when convincing John that personhood might be grounded in a personal soul.

But there are other problems. Following Jacob Berger, consider the soul theory to be this:

> Person P_1 at time T_1 is numerically identical to person P_2 at a later time T_2 if and only if there is a chain of overlapping soul-continuity linking P_1 and P_2 – that is, P_1 and P_2 have the same soul.[16]

Berger argues persuasively that "either (a) souls, like physical bodies, change over time, in which case the soul theory faces an analogue problem of diachronic *soul* identity, or (b) souls, like physical bodies, do not change over time, in which case the soul theory faces a related problem insofar as it cannot explain why souls inhere in particular bodies – and so the soul theory at best only partially explains personal identity."[17] The problem for (a) is that no criterion for the identity of immaterial souls has ever been successfully given. So let us just *assert* there is some *haecceity* by virtue of which this immaterial soul is this immaterial soul and not another.[18] But this strategy to secure (a) ultimately exposes (b) to a profound difficulty: There seems now to be a wholly arbitrary connection between a particular soul and a particular body. Kim has called this "the pairing problem," a problem that is entirely *inexplicable*.[19]

In summary, appealing to individual souls for the criterion of personal identity is deeply problematic if one wants to specify actual individual-making properties. One can assert a *haecceity* about which one can "know not what," but in so doing one explains personal identity by features that are inaccessible and not specifiable, and one must, in addition, simply countenance a profound inexplicability with regard to the connection between a soul and any particular body or psychological state that the soul has.

So, we find ourselves back at the beginning. We have the counterfactual statements, "I could have had a different body than I have" and "I might have had different memories and experiences than I do." Searching for something deeper than physical or psychological continuity to ground these conditionals, we alight upon a personal soul more fundamental than either the body or the mind. However, in thinking about this we run into the difficulties just sketched.

We either can specify some properties of these souls or not. If we can, then since soul characteristics are constant across souls, *there is only one soul* that finds itself identifying with various bodies and having differing mental characteristics. If we

cannot specify such properties and are left with a mere *haecceity* that identifies souls, then we make inexplicable any relation between the soul and a particular body or mental history and run the risk of explaining the obscure by the more obscure. Since this result is not tolerable, and the problem of identifying the person with a body or a particular set of mental experiences and memories is profound, we conclude that the problem of personal identity is intractable.[20]

V

Patricia is pregnant, unmarried, and considering terminating her pregnancy. She talks to a pregnancy counselor who tells her that her 12-week fetus is already a *person*, and that killing terminates the life of that person. Patricia has studied some philosophy and knows that the fetus likely does not have continuity of memory or experience and that while the fetus' body does show some continuity, she remembers that her philosophy professor told her that bodily criteria cannot ultimately individuate persons. She also recalls him saying that recourse to a personal self-individuating soul in the absence of how to *specify* the soul's individuality is merely question-begging. Patricia thus eyes the counselor and delivers the message: "Since we have inadequate criteria upon which to establish personhood, the fetus simply cannot be regarded as a person, and thus the rights that persons are thought to have cannot be extended to the fetus." The counselor looks at the young woman sadly and simply says, "But God loves His children, so think deeply before you do this!" Patricia's walk home from the pregnancy center was not easy because she was bothered by what the woman had told her, even though she was not sure why. Somehow, it seemed simpler in the classroom.

Patricia has a decision to make, as do all of us who must deal generally with persons. Even though we do not often think explicitly about it, our moral and ethical reasoning, our very notion of justice, seems to demand that we know what a person *is*. Are we really *one* person, or might we be *many*? After all, if persons are individuated either by bodily or mental properties, and these properties change, then arguably, so does the person having the body or the mental states. Perhaps we are many persons bundled in particular ways?[21] Since our moral judgments seem to be about persons, a problem with the identity of personhood threatens our very notion of moral *agency*. If I am not the same person that committed the crime, why must I be punished?

Patricia's thoughts of personhood regarding the life inside her increased her distress in the long evening that followed and into the next days. Her mom and dad had taken her to church when young, and although she had subsequently learned to see the world without the illusion of God, old thoughts returned, stubbornly per-

sisting in her reflections on personhood over the next few days. She started to think about how the problem of personal identity connects to the claims of the pastor that Jesus was resurrected after three days, and that He is the "first fruits" of a general resurrection (I Cor. 15:20).

There is something deeply troubling about this, thought Patricia. The term "resurrection" means that a *body* "rises" from the dead. She remembered her pastor said that the resurrection was not simply a claim about incorporeal existence, for Hebraic thought assumed that a human being is a body having the breath (*ruach*) of life. Accordingly, the Hebrews affirmed a *somatic* criterion of personal identity and knew that any hope of survival in the future was the hope of *bodily* survival.

Patricia grew troubled by her thoughts. What is that by virtue of which the post-mortem Jesus is the same person as the pre-mortem Jesus? Does scripture not claim that there is a strict identity between the resurrected Jesus and the one carrying his cross at Golgotha. But how is Jesus the same person? She thought this was such a profound problem because the personal identity of Jesus seems to ground the very hope of the resurrection of the Christian. The issue of personal identity exploded upon Patricia and showed itself as directly relevant to all the beliefs she once had, and the beliefs her parents still had. Seemingly the question was at the heart of the very *coherence* of the Easter hope.

Is it logically or metaphysically possible for *me* to be resurrected after death, or can there only be a copy or *replica* of me in post-mortem existence? After all, all accounts allowing persistence of personhood from pre-mortem to post-mortem states are faced with weighty philosophical objections. What is *in* the person, her soul, memories, conscious states or body, that make it the case that she is the *same* person after death as she was before death? Patricia suddenly realized that the problem of personhood ran much deeper than how she chose to regard the little life within her. Easter hope and fetus hope seemed to converge for her. Patricia was distressed because it appeared to her that the way allowing her to not regard her fetus as a person and simultaneously to deny the cogency of her parents' beliefs entailed that *she herself was not a person*. This bothered her far more than she thought it should.

VI

So, IS THERE NO WAY OUT OF the trap that Patricia, and perhaps many of us, find ourselves within? After all, we have found all accounts of personhood deeply suspect. Bob is not strictly identical to his body, to his mental life, or to a soul that can be coherently individuated. There seem to be, in fact, no *intrinsic criteria* that can rightly individuate persons. Are we left then with nothing?

I suggest that while there is no answer to this question, that is, while I admit that there is *nothing* in the person that could make the person the person the person is, both before and after death, individuation is still possible, at least for the Christian. To see this, we must look *away* from ourselves towards that which is *extrinsic* to us.

Individuation is possible because God *remembers* each and every one of us, that is, our individuality is grounded in His divine, eternal memory. The identity conditions of personhood are not found in us. While we possess no property of thisness, we are *graced* from without by that which makes identical our pre- and postmortem existence. It is not a *replica* of me that will be reconstituted; it is no forgery, no counterpart of me living the good life after I toiled in the negations of this life – it is rather me and the fact that it is possible that it is *me* is grounded in the intentionality of God. *It is He who does not forget me.* It is He who pursues me through the thickets of existence, He who attacks and consoles, He who condemns and promises. It is He who has created me and redeemed me, a lost and condemned creature. Because God "stitched me together in my mother's womb" (Psalm 119:13), I know that my Redeemer lives, and in His living, I know that I will live and that nothing will separate me from the love of God in Christ Jesus (Rom. 8:39).

While the annihilated Kirk in the transport tube can have replicas on many planets, the annihilated *me* in the tomb has no replicas. Through God's overflowing and overwhelming love, the new creature I will be is the same "I" as the old creature I was. Through the strange inversion of theology, a criterion of theological identity arises in the destruction of the metaphysical "I." Through God's love, I, who am not who I will be, nevertheless will be the *very same one* who will someday be in the eternal House of our Lord.[22]

What I am suggesting is that personhood, to the extent that it is a clear notion, must be individuated *extrinsically* and not *intrinsically*. Peter is Peter because he is externally *regarded* to be Peter. This extrinsic denomination of Peter as Peter is finally found within the be-ing God *in se*.

Our attempts to define personhood intrinsically have proven to be a dead end, for there are no physical or metaphysical properties a person possesses that can accomplish the requisite individuation. What is needed here is a different type of "Copernican Revolution," one in which the metaphysical presence of self-certainty is overturned in favor of the *gift* of personhood flowing from God to humanity. Peter is Peter because God *regards* Peter so. God thus functions as a type of *ideal agent* that grants personhood, e.g., they are the person that they are because God has loved them into a self-same one. God's loving of Peter in an appropriate Peter-way discriminates Peter from John and Bill whom God loves respectively in a John-way and Bill-way.

What is needed here is an account of divine intentionality in which *the relation of divine loving* is what individuates persons. I think such an account can be given, and turn now to the work of philosopher Robert Koons, in "Divine Persons as Relational Qua-objects" to suggest a trajectory of such an account.[23] In this thought-provoking article, Koons adopts a "strong doctrine of divine simplicity (SDDS)" that assumes the following:

1. God is identical to His nature, which is either a universal or a trope.[24]
2. His internal character is fixed by His nature, so He is not the subject of accidents.
3. God is identical to His one and only action.
4. God has no proper parts.[25]

Koons explains that (1) is consistent either with a realist or nominalist constituent ontology,[26] and accordingly, that a Thomistic moderate realism with its concomitant notion of intentionality is consistent with SDDS. Koons writes:

> ...the mind is able to think about and understand essences of external objects by including essences as immediate proper parts of mental acts. This is in sharp contrast to the *representationalism* that has dominated the theory of intentionality since Ockham. Our mental acts do not include mere representations of the natures of things: instead, they include forms (i.e., individual essences) that actually share those intended natures. The relation between the internal vehicle of intentionality and its external object is either *identity* (the very same universal existing both in the mind and the things that exemplify them) or *conspecificity* (the individual essences contained by the mind are conspecific with the individual essences of external things).[27]

Accordingly, Koons argues that the divine nature is an *intentional relation*, that it is perfect knowledge and love, and that these are the same relation in God.[28] He provides an example of an intentional relationship for human beings in thinking about trees. When S thinks about trees, S intends an intelligible species of tree-kind, such that "the tree-ish intelligible species in the human act is of the very same kind as the natures of individual trees in the world."[29] However, S does not intend a substantial tree, because such a tree is a combination of a tree-nature and an appropriate individuator.[30]

It is important to understanding intentionality in human beings to grasp it in God, Koons believes. A human being is composed of a nature, an individuator (matter), and a mental action, where the mental action in itself is comprised of an accidental nature or essence and an internal *vehicle of intentionality*.[31] This vehicle of intentionality is itself constituted by an internal relation between the human being and the object she *understands*.[32] This object does not, however, need to be external

to S. S can intend her own nature. Accordingly, the vehicle of intentionality is now the internal relation between S and S's own nature.[33]

But this intentionality of S back upon S's nature can become *reflexive*, because it is the nature of S to intend intentionally that which intends.[34] Accordingly, Koons points out, the vehicle of intentionality falls away, since S's own nature acts "both as the vehicle and the object of the intentional relation," such that "the distinctions between the act of understanding, its essence, its object, and its internal vehicle of intentionality have all collapsed into a single entity."[35] Accordingly, the mental act is its essence, and this "essence is both the internal vehicle of intentionality and the ultimate object of understanding."[36]

Koons next considers relevant beings on the great chain of being. Take angels, for instance. An angel is not identical to its act of self-understanding; rather, an angel's self-understanding is accidental to the angel's nature. This differs from divine self-understanding, for here "there is no distinct vehicle of intentionality that could be distinguished from God's own nature by virtue of its location within the distinct act of understanding."[37] God knows, in that, "the divine nature stands in the divine-nature relation to the divine nature itself."[38] Accordingly, the divine nature is the relator, relation, and relatee, and thus, God "understands all things through understanding Himself."[39]

Koons employs suitably understood *qua*-objects to individuate persons of the Trinity without making the divine persons distinct from the divine nature, or without making the divine nature simply predicable of the persons. Accordingly, the Father is God *qua* knower of God, the Son is God *qua* known by God, and the Spirit is God *qua* both knower of God *and* known by God. He claims that the persons are *numerically*, but not *really* distinct from the divine nature. However, "the distinction between the three Persons is real and intrinsic to the divine nature."[40]

What is important for our purposes is Koons's use of divine simplicity to identify divine knowledge and divine love, and his making of the traditional move to individuate divine Persons through love.[41] Koons claims that the "relationship of love metaphysically entails the numerical distinctness of the three divine persons and thereby ... also entails their real distinctness."[42]

Koons is very interested in *hypostatic qua-objects*, that is, *qua*-objects founded on God meeting these conditions:

- Like God, it [the qua object] is a necessary being.

- It is not strictly identical to God simpliciter.

- It is not wholly grounded in a logical or conceptual way on any other divine qua-object, so it must be fully determinate in its definition.[43]

Hence, because there are only two intrinsic, relational properties of God – knowing (or loving) and being known (or being loved), and because logically these three can produce only three non-disjunctive combinations, there are exactly three hypostatic qua-objects (Father, Son, and Holy Spirit).[44] Just as knowing is distinct from being known, so is loving distinct from being loved. Knowing God and being known by God are not extensionally equivalent and the relationship of knowing is not symmetrical, for "even from God's perspective God *qua* knower of God and God *qua* known by God are distinct *qua*-entities."[45] Thus, there are three persons, yet what is true of any of the three Persons is also true of the divine nature.

Now assume the divine nature loves its own nature and is loved by that nature, and that there are these qua-objects: God loves *qua* lover, God loves *qua* loved, God loves *qua* lover and being loved. Let's symbolize these as L_1g = God loves as lover, L_2g = God loves as loved, and L_3g = God loves as lover and loved. Combing those possibilities, we have this:

$$(L_1g \ \& \ L_2g) \lor (L_1g \ \& \ L_3g) \lor (L_2g \ \& \ L_3g) \lor (L_2g \ \& \ L_1g) \lor (L_3g \ \& \ L_1g) \lor (L_3g \ \& \ L_2g)$$

These are the relations of loving made possible by the three Persons, L_1g = Father, L_2g = Son, and L_3g = Holy Spirit. Clearly, here the act of loving (coextensive with the act of knowing) *individuates* the divine Persons. Without love, the divine nature would not be actualized as that nature having persons. Thus, loving produces persons!

Let us return now to the idea that God knows and loves the world through knowing and loving Himself. We must distinguish intrinsic or *hypostatic qua*-objects in God, from any extrinsic *qua* objects for God. While the former are necessary, the latter are merely contingent.[46] God might have distributed his love in the world differently than God did or known different things than He did. However, this contingency, I would argue, is a contingency in God and not due to the world.

God loves through Himself the world in all of its particularity. If divine love individuates the persons of the Trinity, then can it not also individuate persons in general? While God's loving of Himself producing the three Persons is intrinsic to God's nature, God's loving of the world produces persons extrinsic to his Nature, persons whom by His nature He loves and knows. God *is* Himself – that is, God knows Himself or loves Himself – when God loves and knows persons. I am suggesting here that we might regard the external contingent persons He loves as intrinsic to the divine nature! Just as God understands all things through understanding Himself, God loves all things through loving Himself. Just as the divine Persons are individuated by divine love, so are all other individuals so individuated.[47]

If my argument for the bankruptcy of intrinsic individuation for personhood has been successful and my pleas for the importance of personhood heard, then mov-

ing to individuate persons extrinsically is not as crazy as it might sound. In fact, if one is a *theist* believing that God exists apart from human awareness, perception, conception, and language, then it is *reasonable* to attempt to ground personhood *extrinsically*. I think one could extend Koons's account of love individuating divine persons to love individuating persons in general.[48]

Why is this? For Christians, God *cares* for His people; He *loves* them. Caring and loving are clearly intentional relations. To claim that "God is love" (I John 4:16) is to claim *inter alia*, that God's very Being is constituted by a primal intentionality towards creation. If there are no intrinsic accounts of personhood that individuate persons across times and worlds, and if God exists and is intentionally related to the world, then if we are going to be able to defend an account of personhood at all, we must attempt to offer an extrinsic account grounded upon divine intentionality and love.

But what ramifications does this have for issues of life? After all, life comes in "bundles." Individual organisms are individuated mostly by their functionality. We have seen that human beings cannot be so individuated and that *divine regard* is needed to keep Bill and John from being the same subject. Notice that the importance of divine regard for personhood generally has a profound effect on the question that Patricia is facing. If it is God's intentionality that individuates Bill from John, then that same intentionality reasonably individuates Patricia's fetus from her, other fetuses, and *all people in general*. God's love of each of us individually establishes the person that is loved in God's eyes and, finally, in the eyes of each of us.

VII

ALL THAT I HAVE SAID IS, I think, consistent with the classical theological tradition. There are three persons in one Godhead, and there are two natures in one person of Christ. In traditional Trinitarian thinking, relations *inside the Trinity* determine the persons of the Trinity, i.e., the Father begets the Son and spirates the Spirit, the Son is begotten of the Father and spirates the Spirit, and the Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son. The persons of God are the direct result of God's intentionality, God's activity. It is the second person of the Trinity, already individuated through God's divine activity, who assumes flesh, who takes on a human nature that joins with the divine agency in a union that is never relinquished.

The Trinitarian God is a God of persons; God acts personally and internally within Himself, and personally and externally with respect of everything He creates. God's individuation into persons grounds the individuation he grants to creation through his personal love. Divine love drives the Father to beget and to spirate. There is a unity of love between the divine persons loving and being loved.

In the same way that creation itself is a manifestation of God's love, so, too, those coming into creation are loved into existence by God. *What I am suggesting is that God's creative love brings individuality into being, an individuality that can sometimes be understood intrinsically but whose ontology is profoundly extrinsic.* All this very much affects Patricia's decision.

But what of the *imago Dei*? Does not the notion of an *image of God* entail some intrinsic criteria? If Frank is made in the image of God, then it seems that there must be intrinsic characteristics of Frank, intrinsic characteristics of God, and some relation of *image* connecting the *relata* of Frank and God. We might say this:

(11) Frank is in the image of God if and only if $[(Pf \& Qg) \&_S PQ]$

(11) states that Frank is in the image of God when he has a set of properties (P) "sufficiently similar" (S) to some properties of God (Q). (This is a second-order formula relating properties, not individuals.) If being in the image of God entails intrinsic criteria, and no account of personhood can proceed without intrinsic criteria, then it seems that the *imago Dei* cannot obtain on the extrinsic account of personhood I am suggesting.

But being made in the image of God does not need to individuate persons in this way. God's love individuates persons, and the persons so individuated have certain general properties whose presence makes the persons so individuated to be made in the image of God. What might these general properties be?

Daniel Dennett's article, "Conditions of Personhood," lists six constitutive conditions on the personhood of *x*. Accordingly, *x*

- has rationality,
- possesses intentionality,
- receives a particular stance from others,
- must be capable of reciprocating the stance others assume towards it,
- can verbally communicate,
- is conscious in a particular way.[49]

While to be made in the image of God is to possess these constitutive conditions of personhood, these general conditions do not an individual person make. It is one thing for something possessing these six characteristics not to obtain, it is quite another for the *particular individual* that happens to possess these six characteristics not to exist. While denying being to one who possesses properties of being made in the image of God is a thing not to take lightly, denying the existence of the individual itself is of another order entirely, *particularly if that individual's individuality is due to the love of God Himself!*

I have argued that Patricia's decision to terminate her pregnancy depends upon the principle of individuation: What is that by virtue of which an individual is the individual it is? If she cannot defend an intrinsic principle of individuation and yet believes that there are such things as persons, it is reasonable for her to explore an extrinsic account of personhood. But just as Patricia is Patricia because God's creative love determines her to be Patricia, God Himself individuates Lisa, Mary, Peter, Bill, John, and all people. This entails that God individuates the one who lives inside her now and will grow through birth and all of life's stages into His child. If it is divine love that knits us into persons, and it is persons with whom we must deal morally, then choosing to terminate a person intended by God is a very grave matter indeed. Hopefully, Patricia can leave her college philosophy class behind and seriously consider the argument before her. I would suggest that it is in her best interest to do so.

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Notes

1. Although I never thought it explicitly, I was assuming what philosophers now call *global supervenience*, that two Kirk brains, one in the transporter tube on the Enterprise and another down below on the surface planet, if they are *molecule-by-molecule replicas*, would necessarily have the same mental states. Simply put, the mental life of Kirk depends asymmetrically upon his neurophysiological constitution. Only in this way, would physical reconstitution bring with it the requisite mental reconstitution needed for identity. For more on global supervenience see, Gregory Currie, "Individualism and Global Supervenience," *British Journal of the Philosophy of Science* 35 (1984): 345-58, Jaegwon Kim, *Supervenience and Mind* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), and Dennis Bielfeldt, "The Perils and Promise of Supervenience for Theology, in *The Human Person in Science and Theology*, eds. Niels Gregerson, Willem Drees and Ulf Görman (Edinburgh: T & T Clarke, 2000), 117-52.

2. The question pertains to the relationship between information and life. In Plato's *Timaeus*, the demiurge takes information from the world of forms and crafts a world in conformity with it. Clearly, agency is needed to actualize information of the forms into a world of becoming. See *The Collected Dialogues of Plato, Including the Letters,* eds. Huntington Cairns & Edith Hamilton (New York: Bollingen Foundation, 1963), 1151-1211. Assuming the Demiurge is a living being, Plato might thus be comfortable with

this definition of information: *Some pattern or organization of matter and energy that has been given meaning by a living being*. See Marcia Bates, "Information and Knowledge: An Evolutionary Framework for Information Science," *Information Research* 10, no. 4 (July 2005). URL = https://informationr.net/ir/10-4/paper239.html. Accessed May 12, 2024. For a solid introduction to the Timaeus, see Donald Zeyl and Barbara Sattler, "Plato's *Timaeus*," *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Fall 2023 Edition), eds. Edward N. Zalta & Uri Nodelman. Last modified Fall 2023. URL = https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2023/entries/plato-timaeus/.

3. I did not realize either that I was tacitly assuming a behaviorist criterion of personhood. Yosemite's body acting like Bugs Bunny simply was Bugs Bunny for me. I suspect that if challenged, I would have said then that Bugs' *soul* caused Yosemite's body to act, so Bugs person was not reducible to bodily behavior.

4. Heraclitus is a Greek philosopher of Ephesus who taught around 500 BC. He was famous for teaching *inter alia* that all things are constantly changing. See Daniel W. Graham, "Heraclitus," *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Winter 2023 Edition), Edward N. Zalta & Uri Nodelman, eds. Last Modified December 8, 2023. URL = https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2023/entries/heraclitus/ Accessed May 10, 2024.

5. See Aristotle's *Categories* in *The Basic Works of Aristotle*, ed. Richard McKeon (New York, Random House, 1941), 7-39.

6. It is generally agreed that Aristotle held a view of general or species essences. What is more controversial is that he advocated individual essences. For a defense of Aristotle's embrace of individual essences drawn from his *Metaphysics*, see Charlotte Witt, *Substance and Essence in Aristotle: An Interpretation of Metaphysics VIII – IX* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989).

7. Following Plantinga, one might claim that E is an *individual essence* of individual x if and only if (i) E is essential to x and (ii) necessarily for all y, y exemplifies E if and only if y = x. For a solid treatment of the issues concerning individual essences see Penelope Mackie, *How Things Might Have Been: Individuals, Kinds and Essential Properties* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006). URL = https://academic.oup.com/book/36189. Accessed May 11, 2024.

8. There are many logical issues that arise regarding contrary to fact conditionals. Let us again contemplate an antecedent in which Germany won the war W and German is the official language of commerce S. So "W → S." But we know that a material conditional is true if the antecedent is false or the consequent true. Thus, "W → S" is true if Germany did not win the war or German is the official language of commerce. But in thinking through a counterfactual, we seem to want to say the truth of "W → S" is dependent upon W obtaining, and that it is W's *truth* that is important in the truth of "W → S." For a very solid introductory treatment of this issue, see Paul Egré and Hans Rott, "The Logic of Conditionals," *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Winter 2021 Edition), Edward N. Zalta, eds. Last modified July 3, 2021. URL = https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2021/entries/logic-conditionals/

9. Despite the way I am presenting this, I want to remind the reader that, in my opinion, the material conditional cannot adequately express counterfactual and subjunctive conditionals. Assume that p→q. This is equivalent to ~p v q, so all that "p→q" means is either p does not obtain or q does. Since the antecedent *p* of the subjunctive and counterfactual

does not express what is the case, the entire conditional is true whatever might be the truth of the consequent *q*. But this is not what a counterfactual statement means. Treating all of this in the main body of this article would be tangential to the issue of personal identity.

10. Sydney Shoemaker, "Identity and Identities," *Daedalus* 135, no. 4 (Fall 2006): 40-48. See 44ff.

11. See, for instance, David Shoemaker, *Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction* (Peterborough, Ontario, CA; Buffalo, NY: Broadview Press, 2009) or Eric T. Olson, *The Human Animal: Personal Identity without Psychology* (New York, NY; Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1997).

12. The literature on the problem of personal identity is enormous. Defendants of the physical view are legion, as well as its attackers. For a very easy introduction to this problem from a theologian, see Joshua Farris, "What's so simple about Personal Identity," *Philosophy Now*—Issue 107. (https://philosophynow.org/issues/107/Whats_So_Simple_About_Personal_Identity). Accessed April 29, 2024. Farris distinguishes the body view, the brain view, memory continuity and character continuity views, the "simple view" advocating a soul, and the "not-so-simple view" which identifies personhood with a particular "first-person perspective." For the latter, see Lynne Rudder Baker, *Naturalism, and the First-Person Perspective* (Oxford, UK; New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2013). Farris quotes Baker: "A Person is a being with a first-person perspective essentially, who persists as long as her first-person perspective is exemplified." See Baker, *Naturalism, and the First-Person Perspective*, 149.

13. So much here depends upon the phenomenological evidence. It certainly *seems* like I can think of myself having a different body. But one could argue, "yes, you're thinking of having a different body, but the one you think of having a different body is not strictly identical to the one who was thinking originally. David Lewis, in fact, argued that when thinking of oneself having a different body, one is thinking of a *counterpart* of oneself having that body. See Mackie, Penelope and Mark Jago, "Transworld Identity," *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Winter 2022 Edition), Edward N. Zalta & Uri Nodelman (eds.), URL = https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2022/entries/identity-transworld/ Accessed May 12, 2024. A forensic account understands personhood in terms of moral conduct and of what is praiseworthy or blameworthy. "Person" thus relates directly to responsibility and accountability. Locke writes: "[person] is a forensic term, appropriating actions and their merit; and so belongs only to intelligent agents, capable of law, happiness and misery. This personality extends itself beyond present existence to what is past, only by consciousness – whereby it becomes concerned and accountable." See *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding,* Book II, Chapter 27.

14. See Saul Kripke, "Semantical Considerations on Modal Logic," *Acta Philosophica Fennica* 16 (1963): 83-93 and "Quantified Modal Logic and Essentialism*," Nous* 51, no. 2 (2017): 221-234, and Jaacko Hintikka, "The Semantics of Modal Notions and the Indeterminacy of Ontology," *Syntheses* 21, nos. 3/4 (1970): 408-424 and *Models for Modalities* (Dordrecht: Reidel Publishing Co., 1969).

15. While (7) can be read as *de dicto* modality (the modality attaches to propositions), it is clear that the modality of (8) is *de re*, that is, it attaches to things.

16. See "A Dilemma for the Soul Theory of Personal Identity," *International Journal for Philosophy of Religion* 83 (2018): 41-55, 42. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-016-9594-x .

17. Ibid.

18. Notice that the haecceity must be "deeper" than thoughts that the soul might have. It has to be that which is stable and can accordingly take on or have differing thoughts. Saying that each individual soul has one without being able to identify the properties by which it is had seems to beg the question.

19. Ibid., 53. See Jaegwon Kim, "Lonely Souls: Causation and Substance Dualism," in *Soul, Body and Survival: Essays in the Metaphysics of Human Persons,* ed. K. Cocoran (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2001).

20. Wittgenstein, of course, would suggest that the entire pursuit of locating the criterion of personal identity likely expresses an underlying philosophical neurosis or pathology.

21. David Hume is associated with the "bundle theory of the self" as is Derek Parfit. Parfit famously argued that while one can speak of persons, they cannot be separately listed in an inventory of what exists. They are, in fact, nothing more than the brain and body and the complicated interrelationships between physical and mental events. The upshot of this is that although one can use person-talk, there are no metaphysical facts about them, and accordingly, that what is important is not the putative identity of the person, but a survival connecting physical and psychological events. See *inter alia*, Derek Parfit, "Personal Identity," *The Philosophical Review* 80, no. 1 (1971): 3-27, and "Personal Identity and Rationality," *Syntheses* 52 (1982): 227-41, and "The Unimportance of Identity," in *Identity*, Henry Harris, ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), 13-45.

22. For those interested, the criterion of identity I propose is this: $x = y$ if and only if, for any property P, God regards x as instantiating P if and only if God regards y as instantiating P. On this criterion, it is a question of the intrinsic instantiation of P, but rather the extrinsic judgment by God of x and y instantiating P. If God can extrinsically regard x's intrinsic instantiation of $\sim$P to be W (worthy of salvation), even when intrinsically it is not worthy ($\sim$W), then God should be able to regard $x=y$ when there is some P that x instantiates that y does not. For a somewhat technical account of defining virtue extrinsically, see Dennis Bielfeldt, "Virtue is not in the Head: Contributions from the Late Medieval and Reformation Traditions for Understanding Virtue Extrinsically," 58-76, in *Habits in Mind*: *Integrating Theology, Philosophy, and the Cognitive Science of Virtue, Emotion, and Character Formation,* eds. Gregory Peterson, James van Slyke, Michael Spezio, and Kevin Reimer (Leiden, Netherlands: Brill Publishing, 2017). I argue here that the general movement towards externalism in semantics invites an extrinsic account of virtue as well. Accordingly, for any person x, and any possible virtue M, necessarily x has M if and only if God regards x as having M. Luther routinely substitutes "believer" for "person" to soften the electionistic overtones. Accordingly, allowing B to be the domain of believers, N the necessity operator, and defining the intensional operator "$Rx_{(My)}$" as "x regards y as instancing M," we have $(\forall x \epsilon B)(\forall M)N(Mx \leftrightarrow Rg_{(Mx)})$.

23. Robert Koons, "Divine Persons as Relational Qua-Objects," *Religious Studies* 54, no. 3 (September 2018): 337-57.

24. A universal, unlike a particular, can exist in many places at the same time. For instance, if human nature is a universal, then that exact nature is present in both Peter and Paul. This Plato-inspired view must be distinguished from that claiming that human nature is a trope. Trope theory, often associated with Aristotle, claims that Paul's nature is as particular as is Peter's nature, but that these particular natures can nonetheless be instantiations of a common universal. Consider the statement, "Socrates is white." Aristotle construes Socrates' whiteness as a particular whiteness *present in* Socrates, but allows for whiteness

in general to be *said of* this particular whiteness. While to say that the divine nature is a universal, but has only one instantiation is perhaps metaphysically distinct from saying that the divine nature is a particular (a trope), the distinction seems to make little difference to the structure of the divine. God's individuality and uniqueness is preserved either way.

25. Ibid., 339. Koons believes divine simplicity is also committed to God being identical to His own existence, which is the one and only instance of pure or absolute existence. He does not, however, need this assumption to justify the conclusions he reaches in this article.

26. Ibid., 339-40. The realist version assumes that universals are real and distinct from particulars, the latter of which are bundles of universals plus something that individuates the bundle, e.g. signate matter, a haecceity, or a bare particular. The nominalist version claims that essences are particulars that are really distinct from one another, and that these essences are related by "less than numerical identity" (Scotus).

27. Ibid., 340. The term "conspecificity" means "to belong to the same species." While two organisms might differ with respect to their physical characteristics and behaviors, they can still belong to the same species and be "conspecific." Accordingly, when coming to know triangularity, one might claim an i*dentity* between the triangle known and our intential act of knowing it. Alternately, one might claim that the intential object and the thing intended are not identical, but only *conspecific*. Both are *particulars* though they share deep commonality. The question is always how to explain the commonality between conspecifics. But while it is quite plausible, I think, to explain their similarity by appeal to a universal they both instantiate, one can simply allow the similarities (and differences) between the two simply to remain a brute fact about each. Nominalist strategies do the latter.

28. Ibid.

29. Ibid., 341.

30. Koons is thinking about Thomas Aquinas' metaphysics here, so he realizes that the form of the tree needs matter in order to be an existing substance. The intelligible species of the tree is accordingly conspecific with the tree itself.

31. For Thomas, the internal vehicle of intentionality is the intelligible species.

32. Koons points out that on the Aristotelian-Thomistic account all acts of understanding are veridical, because when A intends and object B, the intelligible species B cannot not be present to A.

33. Ibid., 342. One might say on this view that it is the nature of S to abstract the intelligible species of S in knowing S. Accordingly, self-knowledge proceeds by abstracting the species of self-knowing from the self-knower.

34. S knows S by knowing S as knowing S.

35. Ibid., 342-43. This might seem confusing, but Koons is pointing out that if S knows S by abstracting from S the knowing of S, there obtains an identity between the knower and thing known. Establishing this identity formally is beyond the scope of this paper.

36. Ibid., 343.

37. Ibid. Intuitively, it seems easier to establish that God knows God by knowing God as knowing God than to show, in general, that S knows S by knowing S as knowing S.

38. Ibid., 344.

39. Ibid., 344ff. See Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae* I, Q14, A5, A6, A11. Koons develops a model of the Trinity based upon q*ua-objects*.

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40. Ibid., 353: "It is a distinction that is necessary and does not in any way depend upon how we (contingent creatures) think about God, or how God has chosen to reveal Himself or relate Himself to us."

41. Ibid., 346: "Given the SDDS, divine love and divine knowledge are the very same relation. Moreover, God knows that these are all the same. So God *qua* lover is identical to God *qua* knower, and so on."

42. Ibid., 349. They are really distinct from each other, but not the divine nature.

43. Ibid., 345-46.

44. Ibid., 346.

45. Ibid.

46. Ibid., 345: "Extrinsic aspects of God, like God *qua* creator of the world or God *qua* friend of Abraham, do represent distinct *qua*-objects, but they all differ very radically from God simpliciter, in that all of them are merely contingent in their existence."

47. It might seem heretical to claim that this extra-divine individuation is intrinsic to the divine nature. However, if we take seriously the claim that God is omniscient and omnipotent, then extra-divine freedom falls within the sway of the divine will. Such freedom is known and loved through the divine nature, is consistent with God's divine simplicity, and is a constituent of the one divine action upon creation.

48. I realize that I have not given an account of divine love individuating extra-divine persons, but rather have provided a sketch of the trajectory such an account might take. This is all that can be done here, unfortunately.

49. Daniel Dennett, "Conditions of Personhood," in *The Identities of Persons*, ed. A. O. Rorty (Berkeley CA: University of California Press, 1976), 177-78. See https://philpapers.org/archive/DENCOP.pdf.