A Philosophy of Person and Identity Where Was I When I Wasn’t There

Abstract

Questions of personhood and identity have consistently intrigued the philosophical community, especially in our modern era. While the terminology has evolved, the core theme of what it means to be a person and how that identity persists amid transitory change is as ancient as the Greek dilemma of the Many and the One. Addressing this issue and establishing a stance on personhood and identity is Monica Meijsing's primary objective in her book, A Philosophy of Person and Identity: Where was I when I wasn’t there? Meijsing is dedicated to rejecting the extreme positions presented in Cartesian dualism, as well as the contemporary view often distorted by a misinterpretation of the scientific perspective on personhood in metaphysical physicalism and materialism. She dismantles the Cartesian concept of the disembodied self and the Lockean view of personhood as the unique identity of consciousness in memory. However, Meijsing’s ambitious and ultimately effective critique of classical and modern notions of self-identity and personhood may not fully engage with some theological implications of the soul as eternal, the incorruptible body transformed by Christ’s death and resurrection, and the interplay of ethics with metaphysics. This review will explore many commendable, articulate, and significant reflections on these themes in Meijsing’s work and examine their theological implications.